

Part 2: Planning under Uncertainty, including Planning Objectives

Example: Planning in High-Stake Decision Situations

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions An Actual High-Stake Decision Problem

50% 10,000,000 dollars
50% 0 dollars

50% 4,000,000 dollars
50% 5,000,000 dollars

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

An Actual High-Stake Decision Problem

Who Wants to be a Millionaire?


The term “computer bug” was coined when an insect of which kind caused a computer to crash

- ~~a) centipede~~
- b) fly
- ~~c) spider~~
- d) moth

100%	\$500,000	50%	\$32,000
		50%	\$1,000,000

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Nonlinear Utility Functions



utility function is a strictly monotonically increasing function of the pay-off

[Bernoulli]

[von Neumann and Morgenstern]

here:
risk-averse
decision maker

50% 10,000,000 dollars
50% 0 dollars
average 5,000,000 dollars

50% 0.70 (utility)
50% 0.00 (utility)
average 0.35 (utility)


50% 4,000,000 dollars
50% 5,000,000 dollars
average 4,500,000 dollars

50% 0.45 (utility)
50% 0.55 (utility)
average 0.50 (utility)

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Nonlinear Utility Functions


the more risk-seeking a decision maker is
the more important is the best-case reward (best-case cost)



the more risk-averse a decision maker is
the more important is the worst-case reward (worst-case cost)

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions


Planning



How can we plan efficiently in high-stake decision situations?

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Plan Evaluation Example



average total reward: $\sum_i \sum_j (p_{1i} p_{2j} (r_{1i} + r_{2j})) = \sum_i (p_{1i} r_{1i}) + \sum_j (p_{2j} r_{2j})$

average total utility: $\sum_i \sum_j (p_{1i} p_{2j} u(r_{1i} + r_{2j}))$ loss of decomposability

[Wellman, Ford, and Larson]

[Haddawy and Hanks]

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions


Exponential Utility Functions

= utility functions with the delta property or with constant local risk aversion

[Pratt]

[Howard and Matheson]


- exponential utility functions maintain the decomposability of planning tasks
- exponential utility functions can model a continuum of risk attitudes



$$\text{utility}(\text{pay-off}) = -\gamma^{\text{pay-off}}$$

$$0 < \gamma < 1$$

insurance holders



$$\text{utility}(\text{pay-off}) = \gamma^{\text{pay-off}}$$

$$\gamma > 1$$

gamblers

$$\gamma \cong 0$$

$$\gamma \cong 1$$

$$\gamma \cong \infty$$

extremely risk-averse
(minimize worst-case cost)


“Murphy’s law”

risk-neutral
(minimize average cost)

extremely risk-seeking
(minimize best-case cost)

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Plan-Evaluation Example



average total reward: $\sum_i \sum_j (p_{1i} p_{2j} (r_{1i} + r_{2j})) = \sum_i (p_{1i} r_{1i}) + \sum_j (p_{2j} r_{2j})$


average total utility: $\sum_i \sum_j (p_{1i} p_{2j} u(r_{1i} + r_{2j})) = \sum_i (p_{1i} \gamma^{r_{1i}}) \times \sum_j (p_{2j} \gamma^{r_{2j}})$

[Wellman, Ford, and Larson]

[Haddawy and Hanks]

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Planning



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Advantages of Planning Task Transformations

- simple representation changes
- can be performed on a variety of planning task representations
- can easily be integrated into agent architectures
- extend the functionality of existing planners
- make planning with exponential utility functions as fast as these planners

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - A Realistic Planning Task

when (and what) to sense




Can we characterize
how the behavior of decision makers changes with their risk attitude?

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task


when (and what) to sense



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task

move north (N)
move east (E)
move south (S)
move west (W)




does not provide the robot with any information about its current location
cost: 1 (road) ... 10 (mud)

sense (O)

does not move the robot
provides the robot with certainty about its current location
cost: 0.2

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task




	1	2	3	4	5
A					
B		0.2	0.6	0.2	
C					

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task

[Hansen]

Markov Decision Process model
policy iteration




deterministic search task
 A^*

deterministic search task
 A^*

combine this sensor-planning method with the multiplicative planning-task transformation
see the paper for a complete algorithm and proofs

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions


Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task




Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task



policy with fewer sensing actions



policy with more sensing actions




policy



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task


location occupancy



$\gamma = 0.86$




more risk-averse



$\gamma = 1.00$

minimize average cost

standard for
decision-theoretic planners



$\gamma = 1.40$



more risk-seeking

the more risk-seeking a decision maker is
the more important is the best-case reward (best-case cost)

policy with fewer
sensing actions


decrease in variance
decrease in average cost

policy with minimal
average cost

decrease in variance
increase in average cost


policy with more
sensing actions

the more risk-averse a decision maker is
the more important is the worst-case reward (worst-case cost)




Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task

$\gamma = 0.86$ - risk averse $\gamma = 0.86$ (pessimistic robots)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
A								SSSO			
B		SEO	SEO	SEO	SEO	SEO	SO	SSO			
C	EO	EO	EO	EO	EO	EO	SEO	SO	SO	WSO	
D		NEO	NEO	NEO	EEEE	EEO	EO	ESO	SO	WSO	WWSO
E							EESO	ESO	SO	WSO	
F								SSSO	SO	WSO	
G								SSO	SO	WSO	
H						SSWO	SSWO	SO	WSO	WO	
I	SO	SWO	SWO	SWO	SWO	SWO	SWO	SWO	WO	WWO	WWO
J	goal	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO			
K	NO	NWO	NWO	NWO	NWO	NWO	NWO	NWO	NWO		
L							NNWO	NNWO			

$\gamma = 1.40$ - risk seeking $\gamma = 1.40$ (optimistic robots)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
A	SSEEE				SSEO	SSEO	SSSO	SSSO			
B	SEEE			SEEO	SEEO	SEO	SSO	SSO	SSSSSSWO		
C	EEEEES			EEES	EEES	EES	SO	SO	SSSSSSWO		
D	EEEEES			EEES	EEES	EES	ES	SSSSSWO	SSSSSWO	WSSO	WWSO
E	NNEEE	NNEEE	NNEE	NNEE	NEE	EESSS	ESSS	SSSSWO	SSSSWO	WSSO	WWSO
F	SSSS	SSSS	SSSS	SSSSW	SSSSW	EES	ESSS	SSSW	SSSW	WSSO	WWSO
G	SSS	SSS	SSS	SSSW	SSSW	SSSW	SSSW	SSW	SSW	WSO	WWSO
H	SS	SS	SSW	SSW	SSW	SSW	SSW	SSW	SW	WO	WWO
I	SO	SO	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	WO	WO	WWO
J	goal	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO	WO
K	NO	NO	NW	WW	WWW	WWW	WWW	WWW	WWW	WWW	WWW
L	NNO	NNO	NNW	NWW	NWW	NWW	NWW	NWW			

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task



computation time

	more risk-averse ←	minimize average cost	→ more risk-seeking
	$g = 0.86$	$g = 1.00$	$g = 1.40$
A* node expansions	2,071	2,815	5,808
milliseconds / node exp	4.6	2.0	5.2

(Hansen's method)
standard for
decision-theoretic planners

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Information Gathering - An Artificial Planning Task



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Auction Planning - An Application



50% 10,000,000 dollars

50% 4,000,000 dollars

50% 0 dollars

50% 5,000,000 dollars

orders



Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Auction Planning - An Application

Symmetric Independent Private Values Model

- only one item is for sale
- the item will be sold to the highest bidder for any positive price
- the number of bidders N is known to all bidders
- each bidder knows their own valuation v_i for the auctioned item
(= the difference in profit between owning and not owning it)
- no bidder knows the other bidder's valuations for the auctioned item but these valuations are independent random variables drawn from a given continuous distribution $F(v)$ with density $f(v)$ over the nonnegative real-values bids, and this distribution is known
- the bidders are indistinguishable

Sealed-Bid Model

- the bidders submit secret bids

First-Price Model

- the winner of the auction pays what they bid

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Auction Planning - An Application

The optimal bidding function for risk-neutral decision makers that participate in first-price sealed bid auctions in the symmetric independent private values (SIPV) model is

$$b(v) = v - \frac{\int_0^v F(t)^{N-1} dt}{F(v)^{N-1}} \quad [\text{McAfee and McMillan}]$$

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Auction Planning - An Application

Theorem:

The optimal bidding function for risk-averse decision makers with concave exponential utility functions that participate in first-price sealed bid auctions in the symmetric independent private values (SIPV) model is

$$b(v) = (N - 1) \cdot \log_{\gamma} F(v) - \log_{\gamma} \int_0^v \gamma^{-t} dF(t)^{N - 1}$$

valuation of item

number of bidders

distribution over valuations of item
for other bidders

utility functions $u(v) = -\gamma^v$

Planning with Nonlinear Utility Functions

Auction Planning - An Application

