




Human visual object categorization is best described by a model with few stored exemplars

Robert J. Peters (1), Alex Backer (2), Fabrizio Gabbiani (3), and Christof Koch (1)

(1) Computation and Neural Systems, (2) Biology, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125

(3) Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX 77030



1 Introduction

Models of visual object categorization:


- all-exemplar models** (e.g., GCM; Nosofsky, 1991)
- prototype models** (e.g., Reed, 1972)
- decision boundary models** (e.g., Maddox & Ashby, 1993)

- Very often the all-exemplar models win out—why?
 - memory capacity?
 - orientation of decision boundary?
 - shape of decision boundary?

Past comparisons of models have not resolved these factors

We introduced the **roaming exemplar model** to help sort them out

2 Brunswik faces




3 Categorization task


- Training phase**
 - uses category 1 & 2 training exemplars
 - presented one at a time in random order
 - subject guesses category 1 or 2
 - auditory feedback is given
 - repeat until subject reaches 85% correct
- Testing phase**
 - like testing phase, except:
 - also uses additional test exemplars
 - feedback is not given
 - repeat until each exemplar is seen 7 times
 - subjects' responses are used to fit the models

9 subjects did training and testing for each of 12 sets of categories


4 Twelve sets of categories




5 Categorization models



5a Detail: categorization mechanisms



5b Detail: model fits



Summary

- When memory capacity is accounted for with free parameters:
- a model with **low memory capacity** accounts best for human performance in a subordinate-level categorization task
 - a successful model with low memory capacity must have **sufficient flexibility in its decision boundary**
 - the success of all-exemplar models (such as the GCM) is due to their relatively more flexible decision boundary, **not** to their high memory capacity
 - categorization may rely on a **sparse representation** that is different from prototype abstraction

www.klab.caltech.edu/rjpeters/2001_SF_N_Poster.pdf

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